This paper is conEmral with organizational infomlation systems. Exampla of such systems include intelligence system& communic.ations system& management infol7Mtion systems decision support systems, and administrative control systems. Systems such as these are critical to UL orgaaixation's functioning; indeed to its survival.
Ill-
This paper is concerned with the performance and behavior of organizational information systems, (e.g. intelligence systems, communication systems, management information systems, decision support systems, and administrative control systems).
In their traditional and noncomputer-aided forms, such systems are critical to l Aacpted by kie Y. L&n; received June 2.1980. Tbis paper has been with the autbor 6 mootbs for I =?ELty of wiiti-Muiison.
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organizational functioning; they monitor and scan the organization's internal and external environments, they transmit the resulting observations and interpretations to organizational units that "decide" if actions are called for, they relay the decisions and implementation-related information from these deciding units to the implementing units, and they transmit the progress and results of these impiem+ations as part of the monitoring and scanning activities mentioned earlier. Indeed, organizational performance and behavior are so closely linked to organizational information prm ing that a number of organizational scientists have advocated viewing organizations as information processing systems (cf., Simon, (70); Galbraith, [31] ; Tushman and Nadler, (761; O'Reilly and Pondy, [58] .' These thoughts suggest that a summa&ation of our knowledge concerning the determinants of the performance and behavior of organizational information systems would be useful, useful to those who design organi&onal information systems and useful to those who manage such systems. Although the concept of information is clearly important to those whose profession it is to design or manage information systems, we should note that the concept is also important to the theories and concepts employed by those management scientists whose profession it is to develop, test, and refine theories for predicting and understanding organizational performance and behavior. For example, a major thrust of conringev theory (Child, [17] ; Borsch, [461) concerns the processing and distribution of environmentally-related information. Other aspects of this theory deal with environmental uncertainty, a variable frequently viewed as a lack of information about the organization's current or future environment. Similarly, expecfuncy theory (Vroom, [79] ; Campbell and Pritchard, (14D deals with variables (expectancies or probabilities and valences or utilities) that are thought to be affected by information about the outcome and payoffs associated with certain behaviors. Other variables that seem to , be affected by the nature or availability of information and that are important components in theories of organizational performance or behavior are the distribution of power, the availability of organizational slack, and the nature and quality of decisions. Th&e variables in turn have a considerable impact on other variables important t6 the fields of organization theory and organizational behavior, such as organizational conflict and organizational effectiveness.
In view of these many linkages, it is perhaps not surprising to fmd that the concept of information is important not only to the fields of orga.n&tion theory and or@-tional behavior, but to that of orgonirpron design as welL Many would argue, in fact, that the treatment of information may be the key issue to be dealt with in the analysis or design of organizations (cf. Thayer, [73] Given all of this, it seem reasonable and important to examine and summariz the litem~~~ dealing with the performance and -behavior of organizational information systems, and in this way enable management scientists to operate more confidently in the worid of practice and to claim a fuller understanding of their field in the world of science. This paper reports the results of having attempted these efforts.
The ture dealing with the role of motivation in communications; and the organizational literature dealing with behavior in information systems.
Second, it gives somewhat greater attention than do earlier works to logistical determinants of information system effectiveness, such as the workload of the unit processing a message or the priority assigned to a message, as contrasted with social-psychological determinants. This feature does not, of course, limit the scope of the manuscript to the formal information systems of bureaucratic organixations, as messages transmitted within informal or ad hoc networks are also affected by the workload of the people involved and by the processing priorities that these people assign to the various items of information that they encounter. Obviously both logistical and so&i-psychological variables affect both formal and informal information systems. In view of this, it seemed important to highlight the importance of logistical variables, since the earlier works cited above had focused heavily on social-psychological variables.
The explicit introduction of judgment and argument by analogy when direct empirical evidence is unavailable is the third way in which the paper differs from earlier works, although the difference is more one of degree than of kind. The usefulness of drawing on reasoning by analogy when attempting to identify relationships among variables in organizational information systems is made clear in Miller's portrayal of the organization as a living system (Miller, [56D. In this classic work, Miller argues and demonstrates that the relationships among variables, that hold true at one level of organizational analysis generally also hold true at other levels. For example, the effects of stress on the information processing effectiveness, of an organizational unit are essentially the same whether the unit is a person, an ad hoc group, or an established organ&tion (cf. Miller, [54] , [55] ; Meier, [52] ; Driver and Streufert, [25D. As will be seen, the literature review leading to the present manuscript identified additional support for this position, and identified no evidence to the contrary. As a consequence, the summarizing statements put forth on the following pages are not qualified so as to pertain to only the levels of analysis (or organizitional levels) for which empirical evidence is presently available. For example, in these statements the word "unit" is intended to be broadly defined, and subject to being interpreted as an individual, an ad hoc committee, or a formal work group, even a corporate division.
Thus the statements, which are labeled "propositions" are in general not conclusions based on empirical studies covering all possible levels of analysis. Rather they are statements that represent what it seems reasonable to believe, based on the aggregate evidence available. In a few instances, the literature pertaining to the topic was quite sparse. In these instances, I have stated and supported with argument what I believe the literature wilI say when it appears. So that the reader will not be misled, these few instances are clearly identif&i2
By highlighting these facts, and by referencing under each proposition the supporting evidence, I hope to aid those researchers interested in fiUing the voids in our knowledge about the treatment of information in organizations. In addition, by explicating with these propositoins what it seems reasonable to believe, based on the evidence at hand, I hope to be helpful to those management scientists who are being asked to analyxe and "repair" malfunctioning information systems, and even to aid in the design of such systems.
Let us turn now to a discussion of four processes that affect the availability, form,
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Message wwa?ficaf either the cognitive ' The word klit" is tL pomm;wrr . rr--1 ". and meaning of messages, and that consequently seem important to understanding the performance and behavior of orgat&Wional information systems. Three definitions will be used in this and later discussions. "Information" is used in the lay sense a.mj refers to that which is received by the senses, such as words and numbers, rather than in the information theory sense where it would refer to the diagnosticity or uncertainty-reducing potential of these words or numbers. "Messages" refer to the vehicles with which information is communicated, e.g., letters, reports, or phone calls. The carrying out of the ad hoc or prescribed activities through which organizational members assess, distribute, alter or use organizationally relevant information is referred to as "organizational information processing.' * The phrase, as used here, is intended to refer to a broad scope of activities. It includes, for example, intrapersonal activities, such as analyzing a report, as well as interpersonal activities such as conversing. It also includes activities that take place in informal networks, or on an ad hoc basis, as well as those that take place in formal networks or according to prescribed protocols.
processes IntegraI to orga&3tionnl InformatIon systems
Organizations acquire and internally disseminate information in order to carry out the critical functions of decision making and control. In many cases, this effort requires the processing of a large number of information conveying messages. On the other hand, because a large number of messages may cause an overload on the cognitive and logistical capabilities of the individuals and work groups participating in the information system, organizations are forced to seek efficiencies in their processing of organizational messages.
Two processes that organizations use to increase the efficiency of their information systems are message routing and message summarizing. Message routing causes any particular message to be distributed to relatively few organizational units3 This selective distribution greatly reduces the information processing load of the many potential receiving units having little or no use for the information and of the many intermediate units involved in summarizing or transmitting the message. Message summurizin~ plays a similar role. It has as its purpose reducing the size of the message, while at the same time, faithfully reproducing its meaning. For example, large sets of numbers are replaced by their average and multi-page reports are replaced by appropriately derived recommendations or conclusions. Summarization can greatly reduce the cognitive or logistical load on the units having to process the message.
Messages vary considerably in relevance, length, accuracy, timeliness, and other attributes. As a consequence of this fact and the need to control their work load, the units responsible for routing and summarizing necessarily exercise some discretion in the way they handle messages. Such discretion allows two other informationprocessing phenomena to occur in parallel with summarizing and routing. These are message delay and message modification.
There is no value judgment or negativism implied in the use of the phrase message de@. Since the priority assignment given a message is a principal determinant of the time it wilI be delayed, and since making such assignments is necessarily (at least in part) a delegated and discretionary act, it would often be difficult to make objective judgments about the excessiveness of individual delays. This, combined with the fact that the sources of most delays are the same regardless of whether delays are categorized as excessive or routine, suggests that we not distinguish between these two categories.
Messuge nw&ficution refers to the distortion of message meaning. Its source may bi either the cognitive limitations or the motivations of the sender or receiver. Modifica-?hc word "unit" is to be interpreted broadly, and may refer, for example, to an individual, an ad hoc uxnmittce. a formal work group, or even a corporate division. tions may be conscious or unconscious, well-intended or malicious. They range from the well-intended correction of minor errors to the extreme modification of substituting one message for another. Message modification differs from message summarktion in that it distorts a message's meaning, whereas summarization does not. Although these processes are often thought of as occurring in the context of a formal organkation they occur in informal organizations as well, as anyone's analysis of the "message board" in their own household will show.
Let us turn now to examining the variables that determine the availability of information in organizations. We begin with the process of routing, the process that determines the organixational location of information.
Routing
The red acuxnplkhment of modern Jeicnce and technology coma in taking ordinuy men, informing them narrowly and dozply and then, through approptitc organiation, arranging to have their knowledge combined with that of other spaiakd but equally ordinay men. This dispcnsa with the need for genius."
This quote from Galbraith's 27re New Zndurfriuf Store [30, pp. -611 highlights a principal rationale for speciaktion and consequent departmentalktion of many organixationa. A particularly important consequence of such specialization and departmentalization is that all organizationally relevant information does not have to be routed to all organizational units. Information routing, the process that principally accounts for certain messages being sent to some units and not to others, is a logical mechanism for reducing the organizational resources devoted to information processing. This, and the fact that wisely selecting the destinations of messages allows organizational units to achieve proprietary as well as organizational goals, probably accounts for the fact that routing is so pervasive that we seldom notice its presence.
Although the term "routing'* is not frequently used in the organizational literature: it do& capture better than do terms like, "communicating" and "transmitting" the concepts of direction, route, and destination that are integral to much of this literature, and so we use it in those propositions where these concepts play a role.
The literature identifies six variables that seem to affect the routing and transmission of organizational information: (1) costs of communicating; (2) workload of the message-sending unit; (3) message relevance; (4) repercussions from communicating "bad news;"Q) relative power and status of the sender and receiver; and (6) frequency of previous communicationa. Although a particular author may have used terms different from those of the previous sentence, in all cases the variables referred to were equivalent to or subordinate to one of these six.
It is important to note that it is the perceived, psychological values of these variables to which we refer,'both here and in later sections as well. There are two reasons for the use of perceived values. One, important to researchers, is that the objective values are often unmeasurable, e.g., how would one measure "relevance" or "power," whereas these variables are almost always scalable. The other, important to managers, is that the perceived values can often be manipulated when the objective values cannot be, whereas the opposite is less often the case. Thus it would seem to be most useful to know the 'relationships between the system performance variables and the perceived values of the performance determining variables. Indeed it may be that the perceived values, in some cases, are the performancedetermining variables.
The following paragraphs summ24rk what the literature says about message routing.
htoPOslTIoN R. 1. The probability that a message will be routed to a unif ir inversely related to the perceived costs of commamicating with that unit.
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In order to conserve their resources, we expect organizational units to communicate more frequently with units easily contacted than with other units. This certainly would be so if we could extrapolate the social-psychological findings that messages will be directed toward (a) persons in close proximity, (b) persons in the same work group, and (c) persons in the same socioeconomic status (Collins and Guetzkow, [19. p. 187D . On a more macro basis, and focusing on the concept of physical accessibility, Miller states that "In general the farther components of a system are from one another and the longer the channels between them are, the less is the rate of information flow among them" and "the less . . . encoding a channel requires, the more it is used" (Miller, [56, p. 31) . In subsequent empirical studies, Brenner and Sigband [ 111, Conrath [20] , and Bacharach and Aiken [7] found that either physical or structural accessibility was a determinant of the frequency with which subordinates communicated with superiors.
The difficulty in communication may be interpersonal as well as physical or structural, as observed by Brenner and Sigband [ll] , and Goldhar, Bragaw, and Schwartz [33] and as noted by Jam [39), "If the subordinates perceive the communication from the supervisor as generally positive, they would be encouraged to exchange a great deal of information about task related matters . . . *'
Anticipating these findings, March and Simon argued that "the greater the communication efficiency of the channel, the greater the communication channel usage" [49, p. 1671. Ference [28] offered similar propositions that focus on avoidance of time losses as a variable that determines routing. Studies concerning the choice of a communication medium or information source are also supportive of this proposition (cf., Johnston and Gibbons, [41)).
PROPOSITION R.2. The probability that a message will be transmitted from a unit is inversely related to the workload of the unit.
It is reasonable to expect that the transmission behavior of organizational units would be affected by their workload. Meier, for example, found that overloaded units "destroy lowest priorities'* when carrying out their functions [52, p. 5351. Research supporting this hypothesis for individuals and small groups is reported by Miller [54] and Driver and Streufert [25], respectively.
The empirical studies relevant to this proposition have found support for it only under high load conditions where the unit seemed to be near or beyond its information processing capacity suggesting that the phrase "work overload" might be more appropriate than "workload.** We call attention to this issue of word choice in order to highlight the fact that the nonuniform arrival of demands for message transmissions will cause occasional work overloads, and thus temporarily lower the probability of transmission within time periods where the average workload observed would not be beyond the unit's capacity. Proposition R.2 highlights the usefulness of providing for multiple message sources, especially multiple sources whose workload magnitudes are somewhat independent of one another.
OPOSITION R.3. The probabihty that a message will be routed to a unit is positively related to the perceived relevance of its contents for that unit.
The literature on management by objectives, on personnel evaluation, and on contractual grievance procedures suggests that organizations tend to reward activity that achieves organizational goals and to punish activity that does not. It follows that , message-sending units, in order to achieve organizational rewards and avoid organizational penalties, would use the relevance of a message for some other unit as a criterion in determining whether to route the message to that unit. Certainly it seems that if relevance criteria were formalized with standing orders directing certain types of messages to certain units, it is more likely that the message would be sent to the designated units than to undesignated units. In addition, our everyday encounters with overworked colleages suggest that the receiving units themselves tend to provide penalties in the form of cornpaints to units that send irrelevant messages. An early study by Davis (231 offers strong support to this proposition, and a later study by Sutton and Porter [72] offers weak support.
Relevance, is, of course, influenced by tasks, assignments and responsibilities. Tushman found that, for high performing units, the greater the task interdependence, the greater was the frequency of communication (Tushman, [75D. We should note, however, that while relevance influences routing, this influence is not entirely dictated by formal considerations, as shown by Festinger, Schachter, and Back [29] and by Wickesburg 1811, who found that individuals seek information "'wherever in the organization information, advice counsel, and expertise may be found . . . . Formal organization boundaries and levels yield to the demand of the task and situation" (Wickesberg, [81, p. 25fD. oPosrnoN R.4. The probabiliq that a message will be routed to a unit is inverse@ related to the decrearr in its goal attainment that the sending unit believes will occur as a result of the routing.
As a result of his survey research in three industrial organizations, Read concluded that "Individuals in power hierarchies tend to screen out information passed upward, and to withold or refrain from communicating information that is potent$lly threatening to the communicator" (Read, (62D. (cf., Cummings and Hamett, [21D and organization power (cf., Pfeffer, [6OJ) indicating that information is a critical resource to joint decision situations and that withholding information from one's competitors is often useful in attaining one's goals in a competitive environment.
As we will see when we discuss message modification, a good deal of research indicates that individuals distort those messages that might adversely affect their goal attainment (cf. the laboratory studies of Cohen, [18] [57] . Since message suppression (nonrouting) is an extreme form of distortion, it may be argued that this body of literature also supports the present proposition.
OPoSrTtON R.5. The probabili~ that a message will be routed to a unit b patitiveb related to the perceived power and statw of the unit (except for the situation described under Proposition R .4).
This proposition follows from the findings that (1) persons of low status and power tend to direct messages to persons with more status and power, and (2) Let us t&n now to a availability of information The time that elapses summarized or modified chain we will call "de! necessary to process the other tasks, and (3) the waiting perhaps for its inclusion as a combinat of these components is sender assigns to prcces course, be influenced b matter of timing.
The next several par delay: (1) Some nonsupportive evidence is the conclusion of Davis [23] . in his study of communications within an industrial management group, that "the predominant communication flow was downward or horizontal." It seems, however, that this finding might be a consequence of (1) higher organizational levels issuing directives that were in reality initiated by lower level staff groups or (2) the fact that in organizations with routinized technologies many upward "messages" are uncounted by observers, e.g., scheduled quality control reports or the absence of "out-of-stock" reports which is, via management by exception, a message in itself. PROPOSITION R.6. The probability that a message will be routed to a unit is positively related to the frequency with which similar messages have been routed to the unit in the recent past.
This proposition follows from the Propositions R.l, R.3, and R.5, since it is unlikely that the sender's perceptions of cost, relevance, and status will change significantly in a short term interval. It also follows from the argument of March and Simon that Let us turn now to a discussion of delay, another of the processes affecting the availability of information.
Deb&q
The time that elapses between when a message is received and when, in perhaps a summarized or modified form, it is passed on to the next link in the communication chain we will call "delay." The delay time has three components: (1) the time necessary to process the message, (2) the time lost while the processing unit tends to other tasks, and (3) the time lapse while the processed message is held in storage, waiting perhaps for its relevance to increase or for another message to arrive for inclusion as a combination of messages to be transmitted simultaneously. The second of these components is a function of, among other things, the relative priority that the sender assigns to processing the particular message. The sender's prioritization may, of course, be influenced by organizational directives. The third component is basically a matter of timing.
The next several paragraphs highlight three variables that seem to affect message delay: (1) timeliness of the message, (2) work overload of the sending unit, and (3) number of links in the communication chain. Because the empirical support for the associated propositions is relatively weak, the reader should exercise some judgment in assessing their usefulness in fulfiig his or her needs. PROFQSITION D. 1. The probability dr duration of message aWay will be inverse& related to the perceived time&tejs of the message for the receiving unit.
Our everyday observations and some research (cf., Ulhnan and Huber, [77); Gentenfeld and Berger, [32D suggest that message processing units tend to delay sending messages in situations where premature delivery would reduce the message's impact, such as when the message receiver is overloaded or has a mental set against receiving the message.
Assuming that orwtions tend to reward good performance, it foilows that sending units would tend to delay most of those messages that were not timely and to delay least those messages where delay would be costly to the receiving unit. Another way of putting the argument is that use of organizational sanctions would cause sending units to use timeliness as a criterion for assigning priorities to the processing of messages. has observed that delay in processing of information is one way in which individuals deal with information overload, and he argues that the delay would also be used by organizational units when faced with overload. Additional evidence is the case study of work overload in libraries by Meier [52] . In a more clinical vein, as a result of his interviews with administrators in bureaucratic organizations, Downs concluded that "The most common bureau response to communications overloads is slowing down the speed of handling messages without changing communications network situations or transmission rules" [24, p. 2701. This proposition relies on the reasoning, supported by Allport and Postman [4], Higham [36] , and Miller [56] , that the greater the number of sequential links in a communication chain, the greater would be the overall effect of a phenomenon that took place at each link.
Let us move on now to examining the variables that determine changes in the form and meaning of organizational messages. We begin by looking at those that affect message modification, as it is this process, rather, than message summarization, at which the greater amount of empirical research has been directed.
Modification
Altogether, eight propositions are presented that relate message modification to other variables. We begin with a few propositions concerning the motivational bases for modification, then turn to those dealing with perceptual and cognitive bases, and conclude with a proposition identifying an organizational determinant of message modification.
In some cases a proposition could have been decomposed into subpropositions that would focus on a particular form of modification or form of the associated determining variable. I have chosen to avoid extensive divisions of this nature and hope that I have thereby decreased the chance that either I or the reader would miss the forest for the trees. The references identified with the propositions contain the more specific propositions or findings from which these propositions were constructed.
PRoposmo~ M. 1. The probobiliry or extent of message modification is positively related to the increase in its goal attainment that the sending unit believes will result from introducing the modification.
As a result of his extensive interviews with administrators, Downs concluded that "Each official ten& to distort the information he passes upward in the hierarchy, exaggerating this data favorable to himself and minimidng those data unfavorable to himself'" (Downs, [24, Some research sugg reducing the stress on Campbell notes that be he (the sender) make: remembered detail th gaps are conspicuous' even after conuolhn sender and receiver . receiver against the s to not distress the re that '%rformation, c perceptions of the re PROPOS~OX M-3 related to the discret.
It seems that the discretion in chaos; empirical study rela extensive interview: distortion is to use (except through ou nated definitions ar i.e., they are of fiie &ings, the use 0 discretion in the st those instances wh as in those where * We turn now tO they and the mot __ Further evidence in support of the proposition follows from the findings that managers attempt to create slack in their budgets by understating revenues ad overstating costs (Lowe and Shaw, 1471; Schiff and Lcwin, [67] Some research suggests that message modifications are made for the purpose of reducing the stress on the receiver. In his review of the early psychological research, Campbell notes that "through an anticipatory monitoring of his own intended output, he (the sender) makes an active effort to produce a coherent output, by suppressing remembered detail that does not now seem to fit and by confabulating -detail where gaps are conspicuous" (Campbell, [ 13, p. 3423). Further, Rosen and Tesser [65] found, even after controlling for any possible prior or subsequent interaction between the sender and receiver and for the possibility of any punitive action being taken by the receiver against the sender, that senders still attempted to modify their messages so as to not disttess the receiver. As a result of his reading of the literature, Ference stated that "Information, once evaluated and integrated, will tend to fit the transmitter's perceptions of the recipient's needs" (Ference, [28, .
htOF+OSlTION M.3. The probability or extent of message modijication is positivet'y related to tk discretion allowed in choosing the masage format.
It seems that the tendency to modiry messages would be less if the senders had less discretion in choosing the format of their communications. I know of no specific empirical study relating to this proposition, but note that Downs concluded from his extensive interviews with the administrators that "One way for officials to avoid distortion is to use messages that cannot be altered in meaning during transmission (except through outright falsification). Such messages usually involve both predesignated definitions and coding or easily quantifiable information" (Downs, [24, p. 126] ), i.e., they are of fixed format. It is interesting to note that predesignated definitions and codings, the use of checklists and forms, and most other mechanisms for reducing discretion in the selection of message format would tend to reduce modifications in those instances where the modifications were perceptually or cognitively based as weU as in those where they were motivationally based.
We turn now to the perceptual and cognitive bases of message modification. mile they and the motivational bases of message modification are interactive-what we perceive is affected by what we are and what we are is affected by what we perceive-it is useful for both administrative and research purposes to make diitinctions between them wherever possible. Propositions M.4 and MS identify modifica- 
_
In his review article, Campbell [ 131 notes that both cognitive limitations and personal motivations cause transmitters to imperfectly modify messages during assimilation, stating that the "tendency to distort messages in the direction of identity with previous inputs is probably the most pervasive of the systematic biases" @. 346), and "that . . . the human transmitter is prone to bias away from input in the direction of the transmitter's own attitudes" (p. 3%). As a result of his interview study, Downs concluded that "Officials' perceptions will operate so as to partially screen out data adverse to their own interests, and magnify those favorable to their interest" [24, p. 2721. These conclusions suggest that information inputs are transformed in the direction of the receiver's prior information, expectations, or wishes. McLeod (51, p. 2181 reviewed a number of studies suggesting that the transformation is less if the sender expects to receive further information on the subject. PnoposmoN M.5. The probabiliry or extent of message modification is positively related to the perceived ambiguity of the data on which the message is based. &una summarized the early work relating to this proposition in his review article "On Perceptual Readiness" as follows: "Presented with a complex stimulus, the subject perceives in it what it is 'ready' to perceive; the more complex or ambiguous the stimulus, the more perception will be determined by what is already 'in' the subject and the less by what is in the stimulus'* (Bruner, [12] ). Porter and Roberts, in their review of findings related to this idea, stated that 'These results would indicate that the more. tangible and objective the subject matter . . . the more likely it is that subordinates and their superiors will feel that they are communicating accurately, whereas when the messages involve more subjective opinions and feelings there is greater doubt about accuracy" (Porter and Roberts, (6 11). PRomsmoN M.6. The probability or extent of message modification is positiveb related to the extent of the sender's work overload.
It seems reasonable to believe that, if the sender is either cognitively or logistically overloaded, message modifications would be greater. His early literature review led Campbell to conclude that "Whenever human beings operate at near maximum capacity, selective information loss-undesired reduction of message complexity-is apt to be involved . . . " (Campbell, [13, p. 3363). Miller [54] , [55] has given considerable attention to information overload and found that a wide variety of modifications, e.g., filtering, approximation, and omission, and other devices, are used to deal with it. Of some interest was his observation that "At slow rates of transmission subjects used few adjustment processes. At mediumlrates they attempted them all. At higher rates filtering was preferred, but as the ma&mum channel capacity was reached, both subjects used chiefly omissions'* (Miller, [55, p. 941) . Additional support is given to this proposition by the empirical study of Lanzetta and Roby (431, the case study by Meier [52] , and the review by Driver and Streufert [25] . PRomsmoN M.7. The probability or extent of message modification is inverseh related to the cost that the sender expects to incur as a result of making the modif?cation.
If cognitive limitations were the cause of message modification, and if the anticipated cost to the sender of these modifications was high, then it seems likely that the sender would put forth a greater effort not to make errors and that the modification ORG would be less. Empirical SC Closely related is the idea and if the anticipated cost One contribution to antic: get the correct message fr for having made the mod: information channels mc (DOW-IS, [24, p. 2691 jsition in his review article nplex stimulus, the subject omplex or ambiguous the is already 'in' the subject )rter and Roberts, in their results would indicate that rhe more likely it is that :ommun.icating accurately, JO end feelings there is P mocijkation is positively r cognitively or logistically early literature review led lperate at near maximum of message complexity-is 11, [55] has given considerle variety of modifications, es, are used to deal with it. transmission subjects used J them all. At higher rates tpacity was reached, both Inal support is given to this .3], the case study by Meier :e modification is inversely of rrraking the modification. dication, and if the anticihen it seems likely that the I and that the modification would be less. Empirical support for this belief is provided by Adams and Swanson [I] . Closely related is the idea that if motivations were the cause of message modification and if the anticipated cost of making them were high, then modification would be less. One contribution to anticipated cost would be the knowledge that the receiver could get the correct message from another source, and would hold the sender accountable for having made the modification. For example, Downs noted that "use of redundant information channels increases the probability of obtaining accurate information" (Downs, [24, p, 2691) . The empirical support for this latter idea is more equivocal than one might expect (cf., Hsia, [37] More links in a communication chain provide the opportunity for additional distortions to occur. That these additional distortions do occur was a central finding of the rumor transmission research by Bartlett [9] , Allport and Postman [4] and Higham [36] . Other writers have also addressed the matter (cf., Downs, [24], p. 2691; and Miller, (561. In their discussion of organizational innovation, March and Sunpn stated that "Selective filtering takes place not only at the boundary of the organtzation, but at every state in the transmission and elaboration of program proposals" (March and Simon, [49, p. 189] ), and Downs concluded that "When information must be passed through many officials, each of whom condenses it somewhat before passing it on to the next, the final output will be very different in quality from the original input; that is, significant distortion will occur" (Downs, [24, p. 2691 
69D.
This phenomenon takes place in upward as well as downward communications. For example, Kaufman notes that "An official study of a mass kiIling of Vietnamese civilians by American troops disclosed that at each successive higher level in the military hierarchy the reported number of victims was reduced, so that the highest levels had no idea of the extent of 'the tragedy despite two separate command channels for transmission of news about events in the field. A field commander subsequently declared that "every large combat unit has similar episodes 'hidden somewhere'" (Kaufman, 142, p. 14J).
S-n
Message summarization can perhaps best be illustrated with an example. If a military outpost monitors enemy truck traffic, it may report to some higher level command the number of trucks seen each day. The higher level command, recei+g truck traffic counts from many such outputs and having to communicate a measure of truck traffic even further upward through the chain of command, may' well report the average number of trucks per day observed by this outpost. The fit step has been taken in SUmmarizB tion-a frequency distribution has been reduced to a descriptive 1 ,
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statistic, in this case the mean. The next higher echelon will receive many such reports from its several subordinate units and may be required to conclude &ether enemy truck traffic in its area is increasing or remaining constant. When it does this, the second step has been taken-a statistical inference has been draw, a mean value has been encoded as a 1 or a 0, depending on whether the null hypothesis was rejected or accepted.
The echelon receiving this coded inference may receive such inferences about the increase in truck traffic from many subordinate units, and may pass upward the descriptive statement that "in twc+thirds of the sectors polled, truck traffic has increased." Here, data in the form of binary digits were combined into a descriptive statistic, a proportion. It may well be that proportions dealing with other variables such as rail traffic, construction of artillery sites, etc. would also be received by a still higher echelon and would be subjectively combined with the truck traffic proportion to facilitate the drawing of still another inference concerning whether or not the enemy is in the process of a major buildup of its forces in a particular region.
Depending on the number of echelons involved, we can envision the continuing repetition of the following cycle: (1) data are combined into a descriptive statistic, (2) the descriptive statistic is compared to some standard and a statistical inference is drawn, and (3) inferences are treated as data. It is not necessary that only one step in this cycle takes place at any particular node in the communication network, or that a summarization takes place at every node.
It seems reasonable to message than an (2) the greater the summarization. On the senders seek and use cases, transmission Rather, only (1) where are transmission costs here the fact that the prc
Of course summarization also occurs with qualitative information. For exampie, 1 information obtained in an employment interview is subjectively aggregated and t transformed into a descriptive rating, the rating is compared to some (perhaps implicit) standard, and a conclusion is drawn concerning the acceptability of the candidate. As we noted earlier, message summarization is a process purposefully employed by organ&dons and tends to have as an outcome a faithful representation of the original meaning These features are generally in contrast to those of message modification. Message summarization greatly reduces the cognitive and logistical loads on organktional units. In addition, in that the conclusions that follow from inference-drawing become guidelines and directives for organktional action, it aids considerably in planning and coordination (cf., the discussion of "uncertainty absorption" in March and Simon, 149, pp. 165-1661). For these reasons, message summarization is a pervasive organizational process. In spite of its pervasiveness, however, there is very little empirical literature that deals with the subject The relative shortage exists in contrast with the abundance concerning message modification. Perhaps the disparity exists because findinga of successful summarization, i.e., condensation without distori tion, are less tantalizing than are findings of modification, e.g., alteration with I distortion. Whatever the reason, there is very little literature on which to base propositions about message summarization. i I have chosen, nevertheless, to offer four propositions on the subject. I hope that their presentation will lead organizational scientists to undertake empirical studies of I information summarization and that it will heighten the sensitivity of organization designers and analysts to this organizational process. 
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sutnmari2ution is positive+ ined from summarizing the It seems reasonable to believe that (1) if it is less costly to transmit a summarized message than an unsummari& message, then the sender would summa&e, and that (2) the' greater the reduction in transmission cost that is possible, the greater the summarization. On the other hand in today's technology where high volume message senders seek and use very low cost transmission machines, it may be that, in many cases, transmission costs are not important determinants of message summarization. Rather, only (1) where they are large and (2) where the sender is accountable for them, are transmission costs likely to be important dete rminants. In view of this, we highlight here the fact that the proposition deals with perceived savings. PROPOSITION S.2. The probability or extent of message summarization is inversely related to perceived cost of summarizing the message.
Working against the impact of Proposition S.l are the facts that sum.marixing requires time and effort, and that the resultant costs could exceed the savings associated with transmitting a summarized message. This could lead to the transmission of unsummarized messages even when transmission costs are significant, as observed by Kaufman in his study of the communications from individual forest managers to the U.S. Forest Service (Kaufman, (42D. This idea is captured in Proposition S.2.
Because of the fact that summarization does take time and effort to carry out, one would expect an inverse relationship between the extent of message summarization and the cost of message summarization. If this inverse relationship exists, it would be difficult to validate both propositions, since S.l posits a positive relationship betwetn the dependent variables and the extent of summarization and S.2 posits an inverse relationship between the dependent variables and the cost of summarixation. The difficulty of successfully validating these two propositions, even if both are in fact valid, may explain the lack of reported empirical studies dealing with the stated relationships. A number of arguments suggest that the message will be summa&cd to a greater extent if it is known that the receiving unit is heavily loaded. One argument is that if the sending unit wants the message to have an irnpacf it will attempt to format the message in accordance with the desires of the receiving unit. This, combined with the thought that the greater the receiving unit's workload, the more summarization would be desired, leads us to conclude that a relationship would exist between summarization by the sender and workload of the receiver. A final line of reasoning follows from the : observation of Downs that "when the topmost level of communication intermediaries becomes overloaded for any reasou, it can react . . . by changing the tntnsmission rules so that the lower levels in the network screen out more information before sending messages" (Downs, [24, p. 129D. Thus, an overloaded receiving unit might have some of its workload reduced with a directive that sending units condense their inputs to the receiver. PnomsmoN S.4. The probability or extent of message eation is positive& related to tk number of sequential link3 in tk commum 'cation chain connecting tk receiver to the message source.
It seems reasonable to believe that the greater the number of sequential links in a communication chain, the more intense would be the effect of a phenomenon that took place at each link. Evidence supporting this is suggested by the work of Bartlett 
summary
This paper reviewed the literature concerning the determinants of the performance and behavior of organizational information processing systems. In most instances, these detemlinan ts and their impact were identified from an examination of the empirical literature, and thus most of the propositions are supported by this literature. The review did identify two areas, however, where there seems to be an especially acute need for further empirical research. One of these concerns message routing The presently available literature related to message routing deals primarily with informal and not necfss(iTily work-related messages. It may be that, in some instances, empirical studies of the more formal&d information systems that deal primarily with workrelated messages would lead to somewhat different propositions than those that followed from the presently available literature.
The second area in particular need of further empirical study concerns message summa&&ion. The literature pertaining to this topic is extremeiy sparse. It seems that the results of studies dealing with message routing in formal settings and with message swtion would be quite useful to the designers and managers of information systems, since the availability, form, and meaning of messages are such important determinants of. the quality of organizational decisions, and hence of the effectiveness and viability of the organization itself.
There is clearly much research to be done before management scientists can tell managers or information systems designers how to prevent or resolve any information system malfunction that might occur. I hope that highlighting this fact fl accelerate the amount of research that wiIl be brought to bear on the matter. In the meantime, however, management scientists are being called upon to address problems that have deadlines for solution. They cannot ask the clients to wait for future research results, but mu& work with the knowledge that is available today. By searching out and gathering together this knowledge, by summarizing what we know, or think we know, about the determinants of the performance and behavior of organizational information systems, I have attempted to take a first step in responding to this need.
Two matters seem to be worthy of special mention at this point. One is that the forthcoming inclusion of extremely sophisticated computing and comminications technology, irito our organizational information systems may affect the nature of the impact of the determinants identified in the review presented here. Or, it may generate additional determinan ts. Thus there will be a need for further research of a relatively basic nature.
The second matter concerns a more immediate need, the need for applied research to respond further to the needs of today's managers and systems designers. I believe we can expect to see, and should see, studies that include the following steps: (1) developing normative guidelines for the design and management of information systems, guidelines based on behavioral research such as that reviewed here, (2) testing, revising, and retesting the usefulness of these guidelines in the actual design and management of organiz&ional information systems, and (3) reporting the results of these teats so that when the guidelines are valid, they may be adopted by others and so that when they are not, further and more targeted research can be initiated? 
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